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The terms "biology" and "biological" are widely used in ways that confuse and denigrate
possible contributions of biologists to human self-understanding. As with social scientists,
biologists deal with learning, developmental plasticity, and strategizing in virtually all species
they study. It is from theories about how human strategizing is molded by selection that
biologists can contribute to understanding topics like law.

INTRODUCTION
The relationship of biology and law is the central theme of this issue . In this introductory essay,
I discuss some underlying questions that are both crucial and difficult. The questions involve not
only the relationship of biology to law, but the more general problem of a biological approach to
human behavior. They represent issues that have caused much concern and misunderstanding
across the past several decades.
The first issue involves the meaning and usages of the terms "biology" and "biological." Inside
the discipline of biology, these terms are used al- most exclusively to refer to the science or
discipline that studies life: biology is the science of life-all life. Outside biology-notably in
medicine, philosophy, the social sciences, and almost all disciplines that deal explicitly with
humans-biology and biological are typically used to mean "physiological" or "genetic." To take
an apparently innocuous example, the "biological" father is in fact the "genetic" father. Another
example, not so innocuous, is the opposing of "biological" and "cultural," or "biological” and
"social." The reference is to causation: is the cause of that behavioral variation biological or
cultural? Or: is it biological or social (meaning, in fact, genetic or environmental)? This usage
can have pernicious effects because it is sometimes extended to the false dichotomy of whether
a behavior (as opposed to a behavioral variation) is "biological or social." When this dichotomy
is interpreted as "genetic or environmental" the question is, as
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someone has remarked, like asking whether the area of a rectangle is owing (or owing more) to
its length or to its width.
There is a certain logic behind the above dichotomies of usages when one considers the
enormous 20th century expansion of the disciplines that deal with one or another aspect of
human life. This expansion has caused biology to become, essentially, the discipline of all but
human life. Biologists obviously do not consider most aspects of human existence in their
analyses, and it is in the realms of physiology and genetics where the endeavors of biologists
have typically joined those of human-oriented investigators. For a very long time, moreover, the
study of behavior was all but excluded from biology as a science. Between approximately 1917
and 1950 (the period between the demise of the Journal of Animal Behavior and the appearance
of Konrad Lorenz' influential paper on the study of "innate" behavior pat- terns), entomologists
were almost the only biologists studying social behavior. There was an underlying feeling
within biology that behavior could not be studied scientifically because it is too plastic, too
changeable in the face of environmental fluctuations. The interesting and complex social
behavior of insects could be viewed as innate or inherited, or genetically determined, and no one
much cared. Parenthetically, this was a period during which some severe imprecisions in
theories about how selection worked (Williams 1966) were actually responsible for the seeming
intractability of behavior to scientific analysis; plasticity was erroneously given the blame.
Biology has been seen by many as (1) applying mostly to nonhuman forms of life, (2) restricted,
especially in humans, to traits that tend to be directly relatable to physiological and genetic
causes, and (3) explicitly not concerned with the traits that most seem to set humans apart learning, sociality, and culture.
I believe that these dichotomies and restrictions are having negative effects on humanity's
efforts at self-understanding, and that they may inject confusion into the interpretation of
publications like the present issue. I also believe they are involved in the fact, that in most parts
of the world, the human-oriented disciplines have become or remained significantly divorced
from the development of biology as the science of life. Only in medical matters, and there only
in respect to physiological and genetic phenomena, has the connection been retained. Humanoriented scientists have not been required to keep pace with even basic developments in the
science of biology. In the United States, at least, it has been possible at many major universities
(including my own) to obtain a Ph.D. in any aspect of the social sciences without having taken
even an introductory course in the biological (or even the natural) sciences. Leaving aside
detailed knowledge, a major consequence is that human-oriented scientists are not required to
know about even the most broadly significant changes of focus, approach, or attitude in
biology. This means that if biologists believe they have new evidence-say, from refinements of
theory-that bears upon efforts of humans to understand themselves (as they now do), the very
idea may be greeted
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with either groundless suspicion or misdirected enthusiasm deriving from a mixture of
ignorance and the biases stemming from restricted usages of the word' 'biological ' , outside the
discipline of biology.
If "biological" means "physiological," "genetic," or both, a particular approach is suggested by
a "biological" approach to human social behavior. What physiological or genetic mechanisms
underly behavior? How might knowledge of such mechanisms affect practical social questions
such as the interpretation or practice of law? If, on the other hand, biology is defined as the
science that investigates life, something considerably broader is implied, which explicitly
includes the question of how plasticity has been molded by natural selection, and how the
environment molds the development or expression of behavior in each individual.
One approach suggested by the narrower definition of biology is to search for a core of "basic"
("biological," "inherited," "innate," "non- malleable," "not-so-malleable," etc.) behavior
attributes. If such a core of more or less unchangeable behavior patterns could be found, one
has to ask next: what might be its significance for law? Those who advocate this kind of search
may say that, having located such behaviors, we may assume that we can now identify (or
justify searching for) expressions of law that (1) cannot be realized because they require
alteration of non-alterable behaviors or (2) ought not to be tried because they somehow stress
individuals or the whole species by requiring them to do something extreme or "unnatural."
How does one recognize or locate "basic" behavioral attributes, as defined above? Some may
believe it is possible by demonstrating that a behavior occurs not only in humans but in
nonhuman primates related to humans. The argument seems to be that a behavior so distributed
is (1) ancient, (2) has not changed, and (3) is evidently nonmalleable or must some- how be
inherited. I have three reservations: (1) one must be careful to identify convergences or
parallelisms (patterns that are similar or have similar functions but evolved independently) as
opposed to homologies (patterns of common origin); (2) even recently appearing patterns will
have some relationship to gene action, however remote and complex; and (3) an evolutionary
background or a relationship to gene action in no way precludes plasticity or a strategic
flexibility of response to environmental fluctuations. Quite the opposite, it is probable that
every gene action must be viewed as a potential to respond or not, or to respond one way or
another, depending on the particular environment (Alexander 1985b).
Another approach to locating "basic" behavioral attributes seems to lie in demonstrating
particular kinds of physiological bases, mechanisms, or correlates of behavior. The implication
seems to be that physiological cor- relates of behavior, because they are "closer" to gene effects,
both prove that behavior has relatively nonmalleable aspects and also represent identification of
such aspects. Finally, if a behavior found in both nonhuman primates and in humans also can be
demonstrated to have particular physiological or genetic correlates, then the argument for
nonmalleable or innate
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behaviors may seem to be reinforced. Caveats to all of these conclusions (hypotheses) are similar
to those given above for the first.
The above mentioned approach may also be regarded, it may now be seen, as the (or "an")
evolutionary approach to law: first, one focuses on behaviors which, because they are found in
both nonhumans and humans, appear to have great antiquity and to have been maintained over
evolutionary time, or while primates are going through long-term evolutionary changes like
speciation; and second, one connects the behavior to particular physiological or genetic
mechanisms, implying that it is more reasonable to view it as subject to evolution (or genetic
change guided principally by natural selection). I have already suggested what could be wrong
with this approach and these assumptions (Alexander, in press). Are there, however, alternative
approaches that may be regarded as "evolutionary" and "biological?"
A different kind of approach, properly so labeled, does exist. This approach derives from
emphasizing not the physiological or genetic (proximate) mechanisms of behavior but the
adaptive or ultimate (i.e., reproductive) functions. It is generated by using, as the predictive
theory , the general process of organic evolution and its (long-term) cumulative effects. Some
of these effects are highly predictable because (1) there are identifiable strategies that cannot be
beaten [perhaps the first example was that given by Fisher (1958) for sex ratios; for the concept
of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) see Maynard Smith and Price 1973)] and (2) variations in
strategies are predictable with variations in environments (Williams 1966; Alcock 1984; Dawkins 1976, 1983; Maynard Smith 1978, 1982; Krebs and Davies 1981, 1984; Charnov 1982;
Alexander 1979). I think it is fair to say that this approach is the evolutionary approach of
biologists.
Evolutionary biologists generally accept that, genetically speaking, evolution is a fairly simple
and singular process, evidently because life settled on DNA as the universal genetic material.
Evolution is, however, guided principally by natural selection (for a review of the argument that
this is so, see Alexander 1979). Selection is effected by the environment, and it is the
variabilities and consistencies of patterns and sequences in environments that make the actual
working of evolution a complex and challenging process to analyze.
Biologists also seem to agree-and for reasons given-that selection tends to produce individuals
who in the usual environments of history behave so as to maximize the survival of their own
genetic materials, as opposed to maximizing either their own survival or the survival of the
group, population, or species. Precisely what is predicted from this dogma becomes a complex
and intriguing science in itself (see above references, and Symons 1979; Chagnon and Irons
1979; Alexander and Tinkle 1982; and journals such as Animal Behavior, Evolution, American
Naturalist, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, and Ethology and Sociobiology). The reason
for both the complexity and intrigue is that predictions based upon the dogma are often
dramatically divergent from intuition or common sense (e.g., the sub-
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theories having to do with population regulation, sex ratios, senescence, treatment of kin, and
many others-see above references for specific discussions).
An evident feature of this evolutionary approach is that it says nothing at the outset about
proximate mechanisms (heredity, physiology) except that they are expected to be molded in the
interests of relative success in reproduction. No claim is necessary that a distinguishable core of
"basic" or unchangeable behaviors exists, or that any particular policies may place strains on
human capacities or tendencies. Indeed, most of the proponents of this approach have adopted
the view that for humans, as for all other organisms, lifetimes represent strategies of
reproduction in the face of environments that are difficult to predict. (For example, it is clear
that humans often choose "more stressful" or higher-risk courses of action when they believe
that these better serve their purposes- e.g., Dickemann 1979). It is inaccurate to charge that the
evolutionists' approach involves excessive determinism; on the contrary , game theory-the
epitome of a rational choice theory of behavior-has been prominently incorporated into the
analyses and predictions of these evolutionary biologists (e.g., Maynard Smith 1978; Krebs and
Davies 1984; Dawkins 1983).
It is worth emphasizing that for social behaviors, such as those involving law, the central
aspects of the environment are other strategists (other human .individuals and groups). Because
social strategizing is central to human life-and, arguably, is even the central theme in the
evolution of humanness- the notion of a significant core of nonmalleable behaviors functioning
in 1 social life appears to be remote, and possibly even misleading or downright 11 wrong. It
would be the worst of all strategies to enter the competition and cooperativeness of social life, in
which others are prepared to alter their responses, with only preprogrammed behaviors. It would
be like trying to plan a game of, say, chess without reference to the moves of the other player.
Robert Axelrod, in The Evolution of Cooperation, illustrates all of the misunderstandings I have
discussed. In his effort to explain the relationship between his arguments and the views that
have been criticized as unwarranted extensions of genetic reductionism into the social sciences,
he re- marks; "this approach differs from that of sociobiology. Sociobiology is based on the
assumption that important aspects of human behavior are guided by genetic inheritance (e.g.,
E.O. Wilson 1975). Perhaps so. But the present approach is strategic rather than genetic"
(Axelrod 1984, p.ix). The dichotomy is false if "guided by genetic inheritance" is being opposed
to "strategic," and also if the evolutionists' approach is being opposed to a "strategic" approach.
What, then, can evolutionary biology (or biology in general) contribute to the study of law? It
can do three things. First, it can explain much that we know about ourselves but have been
unable heretofore to resolve, such as the paradox of the seeming duality of selfishness and
altruism in human nature that David Hume referred to over 200 years ago as the "particle of
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the dove" and the "elements of the wolf and the serpent," and that has plagued philosophers at
least since ancient Greece (cf. Frankena 1980 with Alexander 1979; Trivers 1985; Chase 1980;
Hirschleifer 1982; Masters 1982; Axelrod 1984).
Second, it can predict behaviors, most particularly among those still unaware of the tenets of
evolutionary theory. Contrary to widespread opinion, these predictions can be detailed and nonintuitive. I have argued (Alexander 1978, 1979, 1982, 1985a, 1985b, in press) that predictions
from biology can be useful even in arenas like the structure of law and the responses of
individuals to it.
Third, and as a result of the above two items, the approach from evolutionary biology can lead to
changes in behavior that are the consequence of a deeper self-understanding of humanity. Albert
Einstein is quoted as having said that the splitting of the atom ushered in an era in which
humanity would be led inescapably toward disaster unless a fundamental change in its attitude
toward itself and its social and political interactions could be brought about. Whether or not
understanding ourselves as products of the evolutionary process can bring about the particular
kind of attitude change he meant may be doubtful, but I suspect that we should be willing to take
the chance.
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